A lot has been said on the plastic bag issue in the past few weeks, most of it - though not all - critical of the failure of Federal and State governments to come up with a levy, or a ban, or something that was so obviously (apparently) needed.
I don't have anything substantive to add to that; for those interested, David Jeffery put up two excellentposts on the issue. What I'm interested in here, is drawing on a strand that came out my friend Rob's critique of the 2020 Summit. To quote:
"The 'national' aspect of this strikes me as a complete irrelevance, and symptomatic of a more general assumption that the solution to any serious problem - whether it inherently crosses state borders or not - is to get the federal government to act on it."
The plastic bag issue is a classic case of this, because while plastic bags cross state (and national) borders, the issues Jeffery notes are no more national issues than state ones:
* they're a large component of litter;
* they're a reasonably important component of waste / landfill;
* they get into waterways where they harm marine life;
* they're made from a non-renewable resource.
None of these are national issues, they are either local or they are global, not in between. But, to the environmental lobby - who have a long history of successful pushes at national level - and to people whose main goal for the states is abolishment, failures of environmental policy are failures of national leadership.
This is a mistake, for two reasons. Firstly, because while their have been a number of significant environmental movement successes at national level, they mostly occur before the affected bodies have shifted their focus to counter them at a national, or international level. As someone noted regarding the 2020 sustainability session, the coal lobby came prepared.
Shifting the debate to the national level only shifts the debate. You can only outflank industry so many times; this is true for plastic bags, and it is true for public transport (increasingly being begged for at a federal level). If you can't win a cost-benefit debate at state level, there is no particular reason to believe you'll win it at national level.
Mostly, people seem to chase the money. But just because the Federal government has the money doesn't make them the best people to distribute it. The long term outcome of increased Federal control is increased Federal pork-barreling and Washington-style lobbying. It is practically impossible to hold the Federal government to account on local spending issues (it is extremely difficult even at state level). Lobbyists benefiting from Federal largesse might not care, but things are as likely to turn out badly as good.
Secondly, there is the oft-cited benefit of having states: competitive federalism. Plastic bags, again, offer a clear case of the benefits of multiple state policies. As Jeffery says, the issue is complex, and there is not necessarily one best way to gain benefit the environment; levies might work best, but so might an outright ban, subsidies for alternatives, bio-degradable bags, or even some other issue. Nothing beats an experiment for determining a policy outcome, and other states are normally reasonably quick to follow successful outcomes.
From a national point of view, if the Federal government wants to enact change, and they should, where they can, the best way will almost never be a direct policy. Like a market, often the best policy is targets and incentives, but in this case, not targeting the individual, but the state governments.
At the moment, the Commonwealth Grants Commission works on a strictly neutral policy basis. Their only aim is to give each state the ability to produce services at the same level as each other state, taking into account their different demographic, geographic and fiscal conditions. This can sometimes (or not) work in the environmentalists favour, such as when, two years ago, an increase in (expensive) renewal energy production in NSW and Queensland. meant they increased their percentage of the tax pie, at the expense of (cheaper) polluting energy production.
But most of the time, as the Victorian and NSW Treasuries never fail to point out in their budget papers, it penalises efficiency, because being more efficient reduces the average cost of that service, and therefore, some of the savings to other states.
The Federal government's spending authority would be better utilised, not with handouts, but with the whip hand. If the goal is to reduce landfill, then per capita (per industry) landfill requirements should be assessed for each state. If they manage to use less landfill than expected, then they should receive an environmental efficiency bonus through the grant, that both redresses the existing efficiency de-bonus, and provides incentives for further efficiencies (and further R&D into efficiencies).
Practically any social, environmental or economic outcome can be incentivised in this way, provided the incentives can be brought back to specific state government policy (there is no point penalising Tasmania or Northern Territory for low unemployment, though we make a fair fist of subsidising it now). If lobbyists want more public transport usage, adding an improvement factor for air emissions and health is a much better policy than subsidising new train lines that the State Government, probably rightly, never chose to build through a marginal electorate.
Instead of proscribing a solution, it allows one to be found, be it through improved transport, or congestion charging, or travel demand programs, or better urban design. Similarly, a state-wide ban on plastic bags might be the outcome of improvement factors for litter, landfill, water quality and non-renewable resource usage. Or as no doubt some of the states argued, there may be a better solution to those problems.
Opening Ratings: NZ: 1038.23 Eng: 1129.08
1st Test: New Zealand by 189 runs
2nd Test: England by 126 runs
3rd Test: England by 121 runs
Closing Ratings: NZ: 1008.60 Eng: 1144.32
Weakened horribly by the absence of Bond, and having to rebuild a batting lineup also about to lose its only player of class; you couldn't help but hope New Zealand would win, even though you always thought they'd wouldn't. Even after a first test victory occured, through dogged batting from How, Taylor, McCullum and Vettori - wasted so low in the order - and inspired bowling from Mills (4/16) and Martin (3/33) in a typically English collapse of 110; you couldn't help but think the New Zealand collapse of 177 - Sidebottom, 6/49 - was more typical.
Both sides ground out runs in the second test, as the seam and swing bowlers did their thing. England ground out more though, with new keeper Ambrose making the only hundred (102). In the third test, Pieterson finally showed something, scoring 129 in an otherwise poor effort. Debutant teenager Tim Southee showed that perhaps New Zealand does have something to look forward to though, taking 5/55 in the absence of Mills and Oram. Sidebottom, the difference in the series ultimately, took 7/47 though, supported by Broad (3/54) to give England a lead they would never relinquish, as finally, Bell (110) and Strauss (177) scored some runs, and a mammoth target of 553 set for series victory. A typically classy - and final - sub-hundred by Fleming (66) was well supported by several players, but when Southee came in at 8/329 the game was over.
It was, but there was time for an Astle-like flutter of English hearts. Having blocked his first 10 balls and lost his captain, Southee decided trusting Martin to hang around was a bit pointless, and proceeded to paste Panesar and co. around the park. The 50 came off another 19 balls, and he was not out 77 off 40 (4x4, 9x6) when Sidebottom closed the innings and the series. A fitting end, his 24 wickets at 17.08 was by far the best performance, a mess of players scoring some, but not a lot of runs, and taking some, but not a lot of wickets.
Opening Ratings: Ind: 1196.37 SAf: 1121.98
1st Test: Drawn
2nd Test: South Africa by an innings and 90 runs
3rd Test: India by an 8 wickets
Closing Ratings: Ind: 1164.06 SAf: 1157.85
In an odd way, the main thing to come out of this series was the realisation that the curator can tilt results any way they want. The first test was a batsman's dream and even the South African line-up did what they always do, and made excellent fifties across the board, though Amla top-scored with 159. But despite having 540 on the board, after three days, it was India pressing for victory. A blistering 319 by Sehwag left them poised on 1/468, and the chance to force a result on day five beckoned. Needless to say, an Indian side that seems to relish wastign chances did so again, through Dravid's negative 11 (off 291 balls, only 13 less than Sehwag), and a Steyn inspired lower-order collapse. McKenzie and Amla ensured the draw with 155 and 81 respectively, though Harbajan Singh picked up eight for the match.
The second test pitch was uncharacteristically green and the flat deck hacks that make up India's top order wilted before Steyn (5/23), Ntini (3/18) and Morkel (2/20). All out 76 is hopeless, but 4/117 is precarious and it was up to Kallis (132) and de Villiers (217) to ensure a South African victory by the end of day two. India's second innings was better, but no one went on and made big hundred, and a 418 run deficit was invariably unrecoverable, as South Africa closed it out.
Faced with a public lynching if he produced the sort of pitch that occured in Ahmedabad, the curator at Kanpur produced a mine-field. Sadly, South Africa couldn't use a won toss to over-turn India. A promising start well away to be a score of 265 although India was only just better scoring 325. But with Harbajan taking the new ball (Kumble being absent), and with support from Sehwag, India rolled the South Africans for just 125 on day three, before blasting the 64 they needed to tie the series. Honours clearly falling to South Africa, though they remain slightly behind in the rankings. A pity though, that it wasn't a longer contest.
Opening Ratings: WI: 858.29 Sri: 1105.82
1st Test: Sri Lanka by 121 runs
2nd Test: West Indies by an 6 wickets
Closing Ratings: WI: 873.30 Sri: 1091.55
Liek the above, a series that finished just as it got interesting. Warnapura and Jayawardene hundreds got Sri Lanka off to the perfect start, with a first innings lead close to 200 despite the efforts of Sarwan and the West Indian lower order. Whether they'd get the result depended purely on time, as the West Indies (particularly Bravo, Sarwan and Gayle) proved uncharacteristically obdurate, facing out 106 overs and almost forcing the draw. Vaas, Muralitharan and Mirando picked up crucial wickets throughout the day though, with the opener taking 9 for the match.
The West Indies continue to improve however, and in the second test, Sarwan, taking on the mantle of number three, and the dominate batsman of the series - 311 runs, though with a hundred and three fifties he should have got more - was the difference, combining with Chanderpaul to chase down an intriguing 253 in the fourth innings. Before that, both teams batsmen failed to grasp the chances given, with Sri Lanka's key pair failing, and only Samaraweera making a decent score. No bowler was dominate, though Vaas and Muralitharan continue to do their thing, an Jerome Taylor was the key for the West Indies. As things slowly turn around under Gayle's captaincy, the Australian tour will provide an big opportunity for a rating improvement.
Forthcoming Series:
England (1144.32) v New Zealand (1008.60) - 3 Tests
The return leg to this contest should favour the English at home, though as is the case in the south, both sides are at home on seaming green wickets. New Zealand are clearly under-manned though, and it is impossible to see them consistently scoring enough runs to win the contest - as evidenced by the single century scored at home - even if they grind out enough runs and wickets to keep the English honest. Perhaps a 2-1 win to England, but definitely a win.
West Indies (873.30) v Australia (1393.31) - 3 Tests
Tours of the West Indies are never really easy for Australia, even when the West Indies was seriously under-performing, and they were dominating world cricket. The West indies still are, of course, and Australia still are too, but how long both those statements remains true is a good question. Australia's batting remains strong, even if there are question marks over Jacques, and an unknown in Haddin, and their bowling held up well during the summer. Even with the spin department looking bare, Clark and Lee are capable of working out, and working over the suspect West Indies line-up. Australia should win easily, but at least one test will see a surprise or two.
Being rather agnostic on whether Australia actually becomes a republic or not, I tend to shy away from debates on the issue. But as the slow train of republican movement gets shunted out of the Howard government holding yard, and winds itself up for another referendum, I think it is worth noting a few things.
The vexed question is invariably the model proposed, seeing as it needs to be both robust in times of stress (when traditionally, constitutions fall by the wayside faster than you can say "right to a fair trial"), and workable in the day to day grind of government. But I also can't help but think that, as amusing an exercise it is for constitutional lawyers and advocates, we are somewhat over-thinking the issue.
Note, for instance, the key phrase on how the current governor-general is appointed, and their place under the constitution:
2. A Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her Majesty's representative in the Commonwealth, and shall have and may exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen's pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, such powers and functions of the Queen as Her Majesty may be pleased to assign to him.
From which two things should be noted. Firstly, that there is a separation between the offices of the Queen and the Governor-General. While the latter is a representative, when it comes to questions over what happens when some future President and some future Prime Minister seek to simultaneously remove each other from office, the constitution neatly sidesteps the issue by placing it before the Queen. Moreover, from a republican perspective, the goal is in fact to remove the office of the Queen, not the Governor-General, and that many of the problems arising from a constitutional rewrite stem from trying to conflate the two together.
Though much pronounced sentiment revolves around the need for an "Australian Head of State", we could leave the office of Governor-general "as-is" and still achieve that goal. The issue is finding a suitable replacement for the Queen, a person (or body) whose primary role is to be permanent, above politics (at least in modern times), and able (presumably, though it has never come up) to use sound judgement in the resolution of any crisis between the executive and parliament.
Permanent apolitical bodies are thin on the ground in Australia. We could, and it has even been proposed, appoint one, but it is perceived as elitist, and in any case, only removes by one step the problem of appointment. The High Court could serve, but perhaps it is unwise to mix constitutional interpretation with constitutional action.
Australia's Federalist tradition offers an alternative however. Each State has their own, appointed, apolitical Governor, the most senior of which deputises for the Governor-General already. Replacing the Queen with the governors, constituted as a council from which a two-thirds majority was needed to appoint or replace the Governor-General, would provide a solution to replacing the Queen, while maintaining the office of the Governor-General above politics. The question then only becomes, what means must they use to "appoint"?
This brings up the second point of note from the constitution above. The question of method is nowhere to be seen. The Queen "appoints" the Governor-General. The method, be it directly from the Queen, or as is now convention, by recommendation of the Prime Minister, is elsewhere proscribed, much as the details for election to Parliament are left for the Electoral Act. Surprising as this seems, we could choose to elect our Governor-General as of tomorrow (republic or no), through an act of Parliament that constrains the appointment.
The minimalist position that we should become a republic and work out the details is, at least on this question, correct. It need not be considered amongst the constitutional changes, provided the constitutional changes mirror the existing system whereby that permanent, apolitical body officially "appoints" the Governor-General.
Thus, while the eventual republic model will matter, in the sense that it redistributes powers and mandates, it need not actually specify the method of appointment for the head of state. The 1999 model did, and was ultimately rejected on those grounds. Future proposals may too, and Paul Norton may be correct that they too will be rejected, should they fail to take heed of the voters will.
The role of the head of state, and whether that head should be elected is one that may not resolve itself either during or after the republic debate. I am sympathetic to the argument that an elected head would receive a mandate from the Australian people, and therefore, have the potential to over-step their bounds as figure-head and become what they effectively are: the head of the executive.
I am less sure of whether this, in itself, is a bad thing. Granted, it is different to our current arrangements, but it could not be further from the truth, to say it is contrary to the Westminster System itself. That system, arguably, has been pushed out of kilter, by changes to the democratic mandate over the course of the 20th century. The idea of a "States House" was still-born, but has shifted (everywhere) from the conservative bulwark that characterised the House of Lords and Victorian Legislative Council, into the true democratic heart of Parliament, the other place being mostly a staging ground for political manoeuvring and show-boating.
Similarly, the monarch of the 17th and 18th centuries, and even the Governor of the mid-19th centuries, maintained a degree of power - the former by convention and control of the military (though not spending), the latter by colonial fiat - that off-set complete control of the executive by the Parliamentary majority (in those days, a fluid and unstable majority).
While most people shy away from an American Presidential system, there is merit in having more than one source of power and influence. Our current party-based malaise works against the generation of new ideas in Parliament, and it may be worthwhile to provide that extra check against control of both houses. Unlike the American system, the requirement that the executive be drawn from Parliament, would act to curb the more powerful Presidential impulses of the American system (as would Parliamentary control over the terms of election). If the President chose to exercise their power to appoint and sack ministers it could radically change Parliament, creating an arena of discourse more closely aligned with that of the 19th century than the controlled spectacle it has become.
Which is not to say I think an elected head of state is a good thing. Merely that if we are going to consider it, that consideration should be done outside the bounds of a sentimentally inclined republic debate; and that supporters of the minimalist, Republic-now-Election-later school of thought need to be more clear with both what they mean by "Republic now" in terms of constitutional change, and what they hope to achieve by "Election later" in terms of radically shifting our existing balance of powers.
